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I. 
ARGUMENT 
Lancer has Failed to Address the Dispositive Language of the Medical 
Emergency Statute. 
a. Lancer's Explanation of the Medical Emergency Defense Does Not Address 
the Dispositive Issue in this Case. 
Initially, the Injured Parties note that they agree, by and large, with Lancer's 
explanation of the law of the Medical Emergency Defense in Point I of its principal brief. 
However, it is ~10re accurate to state that Porter v. Price, 355 P.2d 66 (Utah 1960), 
~ Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993), Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977 (Utah 1993), 
and Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 29 P .3d 638 involved the propriety of the so-called 
unavoidable accident jury instruction. Notwithstanding, unavoidable accident and the 
Sudden Incapacity Defense are related; the Sudden Incapacity Defense is a sub-specie of 
unavoidable accident. In the end, the principle that emerges from these cases is that 
although the unavoidable accident jury instruction is improper, a finding of no liability 
can still be premised on a theory that a medical paralysis was unavoidable and that the 
defendant therefore did not breach a duty: 
[W]e explicitly direct trial courts to abandon the use of this 
instruction hereafter. As we said in Randle: 
Accidents do occur which might be unavoidable or for which the 
defendant or defendants are not negligent. In such cases, if the state of 
the evidence warrants it, the trial judge should direct a verdict, or the 
jury, applying proper instruction the elements of negligence and 
burden of proof should find no liability. 
Green, 2001 UT 62 at ~ 18 ( emphasis of Randle found in Green). 
The parties do not, however, agree that this common law principle applies in this 
I 
case because when the legislature enacts a statute in derogation of a principle or common 
law, the common law yields. See Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ii 7, 6 l P.3d 989 
( citing Utah Code Ann. * 68-3-2( 1999) ("[t]hc rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this 
state. The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they 
relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them arc lo be liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.")), Schroeder 
!nvs .. L. C. v. Edward\·, 20 I 3 lJ ! 25, ii 25, 30 I P.3d 994 ("Given the enactment of the [] 
statute, we arc no longer tasked with advancing public policy as we sec it. We instead 
must implement the particular balance of policies reflected in the terms of [the] statute. 
Those terms arc the law ... .''). 
The dispositivc question before the court, then, is whether the enactment of Utah 
Code Ann. * 31 A-22-303( I )(a)(v) effected the sort of preemption referenced by the 
Gottling and 5,'chroeder courts and by Utah Code Ann. ~ 68-3-2. To that end., the Injured 
Parties reiterate that the controlling statutory terminology here is the term ··cover" found 
in Subseclion ( I )(a)(v). Thus, this case requires the court lo determine if the legislature's 
use or the term "cover" stands in derogation of the otherwise correct principle of common 
law reflected in Randle, Hansen, Porter~ and Green. 
Lancer has not addressed the dispositive language. Instead, it relies on conclusory 
statements that an unforesccably incapacitated driver's liability still hinges on a showing 
of fault. See Lancer's Opening Brief, P. 17 (stating that "[t]here must still be a showing 
of faulC~ without explaining why, and supporting the contention only with a ruling from a 
2 
state trial court judge in one of the personal injury lawsuits underlying the instant 
declaratory action). Lancer also relies on demonstrably incorrect assertions that the 
Medical Emergency Statute lacks language imputing liability to a medically incapacitated 
driver. Compare Lancer's Opening Brief, P. 16 ("There is nothing in the statutory 
language of either statute that addresses damages or directs the entry of personal liability 
~ judgments against innocent drivers who suffer from medical incapacitation.") with Utah 
Code Ann.§ 31A-22-303(l)(b) ("The d1"iver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(v) is 
limited to the insurance coverage.") ( emphasis added). 
None of these statements attempt to interpret the term "cover" within the context 
of the Medical Emergency Statute. Instead, Lancer assumes -without explaining why-
~ that the term "cover" means what it says it means. What's more, Lancer's conclusory 
construction of "cover" occurs uncritically, sometimes in the sense of meaning #1 and 
sometimes in the sense of meaning #3, never distinguishing between the two. Lancer's 
uncritical, conclusory use of the dispositive word, therefore, does not help the court. 
b. The Solorio Decisions and State v. Biggs Are Red Herrings. 
Lancer also cites to a federal trial court's ruling and the I 0th Circuit's decision 
affirming the trial court, contending that these cases establish that the Medical 
(a) Emergency Statute only requires an auto liability insurer to accept a specified risk. A 
closer reading of those cases, however, discloses that neither court addressed the question 
before this court, making their persuasive value dubious here. 
Like the present case, Solorio I involved a motor vehicle accident where the 
defendant contended that she experienced an unforeseeable medical paralysis that 
3 
resulted in an accident. Solorio v. United States, 228 F.Supp.2d 1280, 128 I (D. Utah 
2002). Defendant retained multiple expert witnesses to opine lhat the driver most likely 
experienced a first-time epileptic event that caused her to lose control of her vehicle and 
strike the decedent. Id In response, the plaintiff designated a counter-expert who opined 
that he was 99.9%, certain that the driver experienced the seizure c{fter the colJision and 
that her seizure was the product of the impact. Id. at 1282. The plaintifrs expert, 
however, conceded that he knew or no support in medical or scientific literature to 
sup1;ort his opinion, and conceded that he had never been involved in" similar case. Id. 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintifrs 
expert's opinion did not pass muster under Fed. R. Ev. 702 and Dauhert v. Merrell /)ow 
I'harmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, I 13 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 ( 1993 ). 
Solorio, 218 F.Supp.2d al 1284-85. Because the plaintiff's expert's opinion amounted to 
little more than speculation or ipse di.xii testimony, the opinion was ruled inadmissible. 
Id. at 1285. Without expert testimony, plaintirfs were unable to raise a triable issue of fact 
that the seizure occurred post-collision. Id. The trial court therefore die.I the only thing it 
could do under those circumstances: it granted summary judgment in favor or defendant. 
Id. 
Absent from the federal district court in Solorio is any discussion of Utah Code 
Ann. * 31 A-22-303( I )(a)(v). 1 In fact, the only statute cited in the entire decision is the 
1 The failure to cite to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) is not surprising in view of 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Medical Emergency Statute (then codified at Utah Code Ann. § 3 IA-22-
4 
Federal Tort Claims Act for the proposition that the United States would be liable for its 
torts to the extent a private litigant would be liable for the underlying motor vehicle 
accident. Id. at 1282. It is therefore apparent that the trial court in Solorio did not 
consider the Medical Emergency Statute, making the decision inapposite. 
The 10th Circuit's decision is similarly unhelpful -which is not surprising 
Qi inasmuch as the issue in this case was never meaningfully raised in the trial court. The 
deci~ion turned on Daubert and its progeny, and a rejection of plaintiff's due process 
challenge. Solorio v. United States, 85 Fed.Appx. 705, 709-10 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(unpublished opinion). Ultimately, the 10th Circuit held that summary judgment was 
proper, for similar reasons as the trial court. Id at 711. Just as with the trial court's 
decision, the 10th Circuit's decision made no mention of any portion of any the Medical 
Emergency Statute. Thus, neither Solorio decision contributes to the discussion. 
Lancer's reliance on State v. Biggs, 2007 UT App 261, 167 P.3d 544 is similarly 
misplaced. The quoted passage from Biggs came in response to a criminal defendant's 
contention on a motion to suppress evidence that Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-
303( l )(a)(ii)(B) authorizes operator's insurance, so the stop based on the vehicle being 
uninsured was a violation of his rights against unreasonable seizure of his person. Id. at ,r 
~ 15. The court rejected that argument, noting that "[t]his section, however, simply 
specifies what coverage a vehicle insurance policy must include in order to satisfy the 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Code requirements. It is therefore directed to insurance 
303(l)(a)(iv)) was mentioned only in passing in a footnote, and lacked any real analysis 
of the question before this court. See Addendum I. 
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companies, and not vehicle owners, and in no way relieves Defendant of any other 
statutory obligation she has to insure her car [pursuant lo Utah Code Ann. § 4 J - 12a-
30 l (2)( a)]." Id. Thal is,§ 41-l2a-301 puts the onus of providing insurance on the owner 
of a vehicle, so upon learning that the vehicle was uninsured, a traffic slop was justified. 
Id. 
That question is quite different from the one before this court. And while Lancer 
and the Biggs court correctly observe that § 33A-22-303 is directed to insurance 
companies, that point docs not help Lancer's position becl1;1:;e the question here is not to · 
whom the mandate is directed. The question here is more fundamental than that. The 
question here concerns the substance of the mandate, and not party to whom that mandate 
is directed. 
Thus, even though the decisions Lancer cites were rendered after the Medical 
Emergency Statute's enactment, they do not involve the legal question before this court. 
In reality, the question before the court is one on which, as observed hy Judge Parrish in 
her certification order, there exists no controlling Utah law. R. 211. The court must 
therefore interpret the term '"cover'' in the Medical Emergency Statute context as a matter 
of first impression. 
II. Lancer's Uncritical Use of the Terms "Cover" and "Coverage" Leads to a 
Failure to Observe Canons of Statutory Construction. 
a. Lancer Has Failed to Observe the /11c/usio U11i11s est Excl11si11 Alteritts 
Principle of Statutory Construction. 
The Injured Parties have explained at length in their principal brief the various 
meanings of "'cover" and Hcoverage" in the insurance law context, and will not rehash 
6 
r, 
~ 
those here. It is noteworthy, however, that Lancer uses the term interchangeably 
throughout its principal brief, failing to acknowledge its different meanings in different 
contexts. Compare, e.g., Lancer's Opening Brief at P. 14-15 (" ... statute at issue only 
mandates what coverages are necessary for motor vehicle insurance policies.")(meaning 
#1) with P. 15 ("As such, the Sudden Incapacity Defense bars coverage for the Injured 
~ Parties in this case.")(meaning #3) and P. 25 ("This legislative enactment reflects public 
policy requiring vehicle owners to carry a minimum level of liability coverage to protect 
innocent victims of automobile accidents.")(quoting Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, ,I 42, 
~ 
98 P.3d 28)(meaning #2). However, despite inadvertently demonstrating that the 
dispositive statutory term "cover" carries more than one meaning in the context of tort 
~ insurance law, Lancer makes no attempt to offer its own interpretation of "cover" or why 
the court should apply it here. 
Lancer's failure to consider this distinction leads it to its failure to recognize 
statutory omissions and, in tum, its failure to observe the well-established canon of 
statutory interpretation that the omission of a term is presumed to be intentional. See e.g., 
Carrier v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2004 UT 98, ,I 30, 104 P.3d 1208 ("[W]e should give effect to 
any omission in [a statute's] language by presuming that the omission is purposeful."); 
~ Biddle v. Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ,I 14, 993 P.2d 875 ("[O]missions in 
statutory language should be taken note of and given effect. ")(internal quotations 
omitted). This principle, the Injured Parties respectfully submit, must apply a fortiori in 
this case because the omitted term "insure" - found in every neighboring sub-subsection 
in Subsection (1)-is a defined term. See Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-l-301(87). 
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Because Lancer docs not discuss the meaning of "cover" in this context, its 
analysis necessarily overlooks the legislature's choice to depart from the use of the term 
"insure," that was already found in the companion subsections to § 31 A-22-303 when 
Subsection ( 1 )(a)(v) was added by amendment. Similarly, Lancer assumes, without 
explaining why, that "cover" should be construed to be synonymous with "insure'' by its 
repeated assertion that the statute only requires an insurer to accept the risk associated 
with medically incapacitated drivers. To illustrate: if, as Lancer insists, the Injured Parties 
must first prove that Lancer'$ insureds were at fault before its policy must "cover" their 
damages as Subsection ( I )(a)(v) mandates, then "cover" carries precisely the same 
meaning as "'insure," found throughout the rest of Subsection (I). Thus, the failure to 
consider what "cover" might mean in this context has precipitated Lancer's failure to 
observe the principle or e.,·1m·ssio uniu.\· est exclusio altcrius. This construction, being 
inconsistent with established canons or statutory construction, should be rejected. 
In a closely related analytical naw, Lancer never addresses the legislative 
omission of the concept of ""liability imposed by law" from Subsection ( I )(a)(v). Because 
that clause appears in the neighboring, pre-existing subsections al the time Subsection 
( I )(a)(v) was enacted, its omission from Subsection (l)(a)(v) leads to the presumption 
that the legislature did not contemplate limiting Subsection ( I )(a)(v) to situations where 
liability would be imposed by law. Instead, the Medical Emergency Statute contemplates 
imposing an obligation on an insurer to cover damages its incapacitated driver causes, 
whether the insured would be held liable at common law or not. Thus, even though the 
phrase "strict liability" does not appear, strict liability is precisely what the legislature 
8 
described by omitting "liability imposed by law" from Subsection (1 )(a)(v). Lancer's 
contention to the contrary is another violation of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
principle and should be rejected for this reason as well. 
b. Lancer's Construction Produces an Unacceptable Absurd Result. 
In its argument that the Medical Emergency Statute only requires that insurers 
~ accept the risk of injury flowing from an unforeseeable medical paralysis, Lancer 
contends that "[t]here must still be a showing of fault." Lancer's Opening Brief, P. 17. 
That is, according to Lancer; a plaintiff injured by an unforeseeably incapacitated driver 
must prove that the driver was at fault in order to fall under the mandate of Utah Code 
Ann. § 3 lA-22-303(1 )(a)(v). 
The difficulty with this position manifests itself when one considers how the 
statute might operate viz-a-viz an actual claim by an innocent, injured third party. As 
Lancer explains in Point I of its principal brief, when a driver experiences a sudden 
medical paralysis, the driver is not at fault because she did not breach her duty. See also 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-817(2) ("Fault means any actionable breach oflegal duty ... "). 
Consider also that a liability insurer's obligation to provide coverage (meaning #3) to a 
third party is derivative of its insured's legal liability. See e.g., R. 77. So when a driver 
~ loses consciousness due to an unforeseeable medical condition and injures an innocent 
third party as a result, the driver is not at fault as a matter of law. And even though the 
driver's insurer provides coverage for damages flowing from the incapacity, the coverage 
~ 
is not triggered unless the driver is at fault, which she is not. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
5-817(2). The Medical Emergency Statute therefore, according to Lancer, mandates a 
9 
coverage that covers exactly nothing. 
In addition to creating an illusory coverage, this construction is antithetical to the 
definition of insurance because the risk is not shifted between contracting parties, viz., 
insured and insurer. Instead, in a rather perverse irony, the risk is actually shifted from 
the insured driver to a stranger to the contract of insurance: an innocent third party who 
unfortunately finds herself in the wrong place at the wrong time. Contra Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31 A-1-30 I (87). This construction, but for the lack of an underlying common law tort, 
.. 
. , 
would more closdy resemble a civil conspiracy than it docs insurance. Compare Esr,·ada 
v. Al/endo::,a, 2012 UT App 82, ,1,1 13-14, 275 P.3d I 024 ,,vith Utah Code Ann. § 3 f J\-1-
30 I (87). This result is absurd by any measure and should be rejected for this reason as 
well. 
111. Lancer's Argument Against Strict Liability Misses the Mark. 
Lancer's third point actually includes two analytically distinct issues. First, Lancer 
discusses public policy considerations appellate courts analyze when called upon to 
expand the common law. Specifically, in Hammontree v. Jenner 20 Cal.App.3d 528, 530, 
531-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist 197 I), the court declined to apply principles of strict 
products liability in a case that involved a driver who experienced an unforeseeable 
seizure that resulted in an injury-causing motor vehicle accident. This decision was, as 
arc all common law-based decisions, grounded in that court's public policy judgments. 
See id. So loo with Roman v. Estate <~/'Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, ilil 2, 54 (Ohio 2003), 
where the court declined to impose strict liability on a driver who experienced an 
unforeseeable heart attack while driving that resulted in the death of two other third 
10 
parties. 
Lancer then cites this court's decision in Graves v. Northeastern Services, Inc., 
2015 UT 28, 1 75, 345 P .3d 619 in support of its criticism of the Injured Parties' citation 
to legislative history. Lancer then concludes by referring back to Hammontree and a law 
review article on strict liability, arguing that public policy precludes expanding the rule of 
(ii strict liability to motor vehicle accident cases. See Lancer's Opening Brief PP. 17-25. 
This argument conflates to analytically distinct points: I) expansion of the rule of 
strict liability by common law; 2) the proper use of legislative history in questions of-
statutory construction. Neither of these points, however, is helpful. The first is unhelpful 
because the Injured Parties have not requested an expansion of the rule of strict liability 
~ to the present context as a matter of common law.2 That question is not before the court. 
So Hammontree and Roman are inapposite, as Lancer appears to concede: "Neither of 
these cases involved any statutes, but only address the application of strict liability for a 
driver's unforeseen loss of consciousness, resulting in injury, and in that context have 
declined to apply strict liability." Id. at P. 18. 
The second point is more deserving of the court's attention. Lancer correctly 
2 Had the Injured Parties made this argument, it would be appropriate for this court, as the 
final arbiter of the common law in the State of Utah, to weigh public policy 
considerations. See e.g., Burton v. Exam Center Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 2000 
UT 18 at 17, 994 P.2d 1261 ("We must therefore decide whether a public policy exists 
justifying the creation of a common law cause of action .... "). Instead, the Injured Parties 
maintain that the legislature has enacted a statute in derogation of the common law, so 
this court's review is constrained to interpreting the statute in question. See Gottling, 
2002 UT 95 at 1 7 ( citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2(1999)), Schroeder Invs 2013 UT 25 
at 125. 
11 
observes this court's skepticism over resorting io legislative history in questions of 
statutory interpretation, and its preference to ground its decisions in the language of the 
statute where possible. See Schroeder Investments, 2013 UT 25 at ii 23 ("In a case like 
this one where the statute speaks directly to the issue before us ... , the statute is 
supreme."), Graves, 1015 UT 28 at ii 6 7 ("as our recent decisions have emphasized, the 
governing law is defined not by our abstract sense of legislative purpose, but by the 
statutory text that survived the constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment."), 
':' j tj 
State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ii J 7, 25 I P.3d 829 ("Any su~.•:)ositions about what. the 
legislature may have intended cannot properly override what it actua11y did.'~), Orlando 
/vlillcnia. LC v. United Title Servs. D_l Utah, Inc., 2015 UT 55, ii 71, 355 P.3d 965. In 
essence, Lancer intimates that the f njured Parties have cherry-picked quotations from the 
floor debates that support their preferred construction. Or, to borrow Judge Leventhal 's 
metaphor, Lancer suggests the Injured Parties have looked over a crowd of people in 
search of their friends. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Ohscrvations on the Use ,f 
Legislative Histm~v in the I 98 / Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 2) 4 ( 1983 ). 
What Lancer has failed to do is substantiate the suggestion or cherry-picking with 
portions of legislative history suggestive of a contrary intent, possibly because such a 
contrary intent is not to be found. As discussed in the Injured Parties' principal brief, the 
bill encountered no meaningful resistance and required very little discussion, either in 
committee or on the floor of either legislative body prior to being approved by both 
houses and signed into law. Indeed, the Injured Parties' research into legislative history 
disclosed no contrary intent, and certainly Lancer has not cited this court to any. 
12 
But the more salient point is that the Injured Parties do not cite to legislative 
history in the hope that the court will impose an intent not manifest in the statute's plain 
language, nor do the Injured Parties urge that the court use legislative history to influence 
its plain language construction of the statute. The point is to illustrate legislative intent in 
the event the court concludes that the Medical Emergency Statute language is ambiguous 
~ -which the Injured Parties maintain it should not do for reasons articulated above and in 
greater detail in their principal brief. However, in cases where the court finds a statute 
ambiguous, it is proper to resort to means of secondary construction, including legislative 
history. LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39,126, 337 P.3d 254. Thus, should the court decide 
that the statute contains an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by an appeal to primary 
sources (viz., the language of the statute itself, context, neighboring subsections, etc ... ), 
an appeal to legislative history is appropriate. 
Thus, Lancer's arguments against expanding the common law miss the mark. The 
Injured Parties have not asked this court to expand the common law rule of strict liability. 
The plain language of the Medical Emergency Statute discloses that the legislature has 
imposed strict liability in this context by statute. 
IV. The Plain Language of the Medical Emergency Statute Contains an 
Important Cue that the Legislature Intended it to Supplant the Common 
Law Rule Expressed in Randle, Porter, Hansen, and Green. 
Further support for the Injured Parties' construction of the Medical Emergency 
Statute is found in the challenged jury instruction in Porter. But to understand why this 
portion of the plain language supports the Injured Parties' construction, the court must 
recall that core of the Sudden Incapacity Defense is a contention that the driver did not 
13 
have reasonable notice of the onset of the condition. This is another iteration of the 
concept of foreseeability in the context of the breach element. See Jeff.s· v. West, 20 I 2 UT 
11, ii 26, 275 P.3d 228 (noting that foreseeability analysis within the breach element asks 
whether, under the facts of the case, the defendant conducted herself as a reasonably 
prudent person would). Thus, when the Sudden Incapacity Defense in in play, the real 
contention is that the defendant did not breach a duty. 
That concept was iterated in Porter. Like this case, Porter involved an injury that 
arose from a driver's unforeseeable medical incapacity. Porter, 355 P.2d at 67. In 
addition to the unavoidable accident instruction, the jury was given an instruction on the 
Sudden Incapacity Defense: 
A driver of an automobile who is stricken by paralysis, seized by a fit 
or otherwise rendered unconscious and who still continues to drive 
while unconscious and causes damages or injury to another cannot be 
held responsible therefor unless he 11,•as rca.,·onah~l' aH'at-c that he was 
ahout to lose consciousness to the extent that a person <~{ordina,y 
prudence l,vould not attempt to continue drh·ing. 
Id. at 68 ( emphasis added). 
This specific instruction was later disavowed in Randle. Rane/le, 862 P.2cl at 1336. 
Randle did not, however, change substantive law. Id. ("Of course, accidents do occur 
which might be unavoidable or for which the defendant or defendants are not negligent. 
In such cases, if the state of the evidence warrants it, the trial judge should direct a 
verdict, or the jury, applying proper instructions on the elements of negligence and 
burden of proof, should find no liability."). Thus, the Porter instruction indicates that 
when an unforeseeable medical paralysis occurs, the defendant has not breached a duty 
14 
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and is not liable. By extension, the defendant's insurer has no obligation to provide 
coverage (meaning #3) to an injured party. See e.g., Lancer's Opening Brief, P. 15 ("As 
such, the Sudden Incapacity defense bars coverage for the Injured Parties in this case."). 
So under the rule as stated in Porter, a liability insurer would have no obligation to 
pay damages sustained as a result of the insured driver's unforeseeable incapacitating 
~ event while driving. See e.g., R. 77. Thus, the insurer would not be required to cover 
those damages (meaning #3). 
With that in mind, it is significant that the Medical Emergency Statute adopts tLe 
operative language from the Porter instruction that previously defeated the insured 
driver's liability and, by extension, the insurer's obligation to cover that liability: 
a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage ... shall ... 
cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a motor 
vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, or other 
unconscious condition and who is not reasonably aware that 
paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about to occur to 
the extent that a person of ordina1J1 prudence would not attempt to 
continue driving. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) (emphasis added). Thus, by mandating that 
insurers must "cover" a class of damages that they were not required to cover previously 
under Porter, the legislature contemplated that the term "cover" would impose liability 
where it did not exist previously. 
This is a further plain language cue that the legislature's intent was to impose 
~ liability where it did not exist previously. And even further support of this construction is 
found in Subsection (l)(b), which expressly contemplates an insured driver's liability, 
15 
and caps her liability at the applicable policy limits in effect at the time of the accident. 
Lancer's construction to the contrary is therefore inconsistent with the plain language of 
the statute and should be rejected. The court should instead adopt the construction of the 
statute propounded by the Injured Parties. 
V. Lancer's Argument that the Injured Parties' Recovery is Capped at 
Statutory Minimum Requirements is an Academic Question. 
In the Injured Parties' principal brief: they contended that if the court construed 
Subse~ifon ( I )(b,1 ?o limit their recovery the ,ipplicablc statutory minimJn~, limits, die 
court should apply the correct minimums, which the Injured Parties stated to be 
$750,000.00. 
While the Injured Parties persist in their bcl ief that the court should apply the 
correct statutory minimum, their citation to $750,000 is not the correct statutory 
minimum requirement. Thal minimum requirement applies lo motor carriers not 
operating for-hire. See Utah Admin. Code R.909-1-3. There is no dispute in this case that 
the motor carrier was operating for-hire. Thus, the Injured Parties concede that R 909-1-
3(2) docs not apply. 
The correct minimum statutory requirement is established as follows: The 
department of transportation is statutorily authorized to incorporate minimum insurance 
requirements stated in the Code or Federal Regulations. Utah Code Ann. § 72-9-103(a). 
Pursuant to this grant of administrative authority, such a rule was enacted. See Utah 
Adm in. Code R 909-1-1 ( stating that rule 909-1 is enacted under authority of Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-9-103 ), R909- I -2 C'Safety Regulations for Motor Carriers, 49 CFR ... Parts 
16 
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Q 
387 through 399 ... are incorporated by reference .... "). The applicable federal 
regulations require that any vehicle with a seating capacity of 16 passengers or more is 
required to carry at least $5,000,000.00 in liability insurance. 49 CFR § 387.33. Thus, if 
the court is persuaded that minimum statutory insurance requirements apply, the correct 
minimum insurance amount is $5,000,000.00. And while the record on appeal does not 
~ contain a reference to the policy limits in place for Lancer's insured driver, the Injured 
Parties represent to the court that the policy limits in effect on the date of the underlying 
accident is $5,000,000.00. Thus, whether the Injured Pmiies are correct that actual policy 
limits govern, or whether Lancer is correct that minimum policy limits requirements 
govern, the result in this case is the same: the proper cap of Lancer's insured driver's 
liability is $5,000,000.00. 
Nevertheless, the Injured Parties submit that Lancer's contention that an 
incapacitated driver's liability is capped at the applicable minimum statutory 
requirements is not well-taken. In support of this contention, Lancer cites to several cases 
decided under other portions of Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-303 and urges this court to 
draw an analogy from these cases to the present case and cap the Injured Parties' 
recovery at statutory minimum requirements. These cases, however, do not support 
~ Lancer's request. 
~ 
But before considering the analytical flaws manifest in reliance on those cases, it 
should be observed that Lancer's argument on Question #2 lacks support in the plain 
language of the statute, which limits "[t]he driver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(v) .. 
. to the insurance coverage." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l)(b). To accept Lancer's 
17 
construction, the court must construe Hthe insurance coverage/' to refer to the statutory 
minimum requirements stated in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-304, despite the lack of 
language supportive of that conclusion. The more logical interpretation is that "the 
insurance coverage" refers to the insured driver's liability coverage in effect at the time 
of the accident, if for no other reason than because it exists in a subsection dedicated to 
the drivcr''s motor vehicle liability insurance. Furthermore, Subsection ( I )(b) 
contemplates a driver who experiences the unforeseeable medical condition, and her 
Ji~ 
liabiiity under Subsection ( I ){a)(v). Id. Given that, the clause "the insur~:ncc coveragen 
most logicaJly contemplates the insurance coverage of the driver who experiences the 
incapacitating event that is in effect when her liability under Subsection ( J ){a)(v) arises. 
Plain language analysis, therefore, betrays Lancer~s failure to consider what is 
apparent on the face or the statute~ and obviates the need to consider the case law Lancer 
relics on in its answer to Question #2. 
But even if the court considers the cases Lancer cites, Lancer's position still lacks 
support. For example, in SiJeros the court relied on the statutory requirement to provide 
insurance for liability imposed by law and observed that the statute did not distinguish 
between negligence liability and intentional tort liability. Speros, 2004 UT 69 at ,I 43. 
Thus, to the extent the policy exclusion was inconsistent with the statute"s mandate, the 
exclusion was unenforceable. See id. at ii 44. However, because Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-
22-304 only mandates the minimum policy limits, the intentional acts exclusion was not 
disturbed for any portion of the policy limits that exceeds the ininimum requirements. Id. 
The holding in Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619 
18 
P.2d 329 (Utah 1980) is functionauy identical, only it involved the validity of a named-
driver exclusion. Id at 331. The analysis and result are otherwise identical. Id. at 333. 
The analysis and holding was slightly different in Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P .2d 
231 (Utah 1985), where the court invalidated the household exclusion entirely because 
the No-Fault Act only authorized exclusions for intentional self-injury and for damages 
caused while committing a felony. Id at 234. Because the household exemption did not 
fall in either category, it was held to be an impermissible exclusion and therefore 
unenforceable. Id. 
The common thread to these cases is the statutory invalidation of an exclusion 
from coverage under an insurance contract. Speros, 2004 UT 69 at ,r 43; Allstate, 619 
P.2d at 332, 33, Call, 712 P.2d at 234. The principles stated therein are therefore 
principles of contract law. See e.g., Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, ,r 
7, 201 P .3d 1004 ("An insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the 
insurer." (citing Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, ,r 4, 133 P.3d 428)). This case, 
by contrast, does not involve a question of contract law. Instead, it involves the statutory 
modification of principles of tort law, as explained above and in the Injured Parties' 
principal brief. Because the law of contract and the law of tort are fundamentally 
~ different, there is little in Speros, Allstate, or Call that can or should inform the court's 
decision here. 
There is, however, a passing similarity between the results in those cases and how 
the Medical Emergency Statute functions in this case. As a result of Subsection (1 )(b ), 
the incapacitated driver's legal liability imposed by Subsection (l)(a)(v) is capped at her 
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limits of insurance in effect at the time of the accident. Thus, it is conceivable that a 
plaintiffs damages could exceed the defendant's liability exposure, allowing the plaintiff 
to enforce the excess portion of the judgment against the defendant ·s personal assets 
through a variety of means. See, e.g.. Utah R. Cir. Pro. 64 et seq. (writs), Utah Code Ann. 
§ 788-5-20 Jet seq. (judgment liens). That similarity, however, is superficial because 
neither Speros nor Allstate modified the insured driver's underlying tort liability; both 
cases only modified the insurer's contractual obligations vis-a-vis its insured's underlying 
;f ~ 
tort liability. 
By contrast, under the Medical Emergency Statute, 4~lhc driver's liability under 
Subsection ( I )(a)(v) is limited to the insurance coverage.H Utah Code Ann. * 31 A-22-
30.1( I )(b ). Subsection ( I )(b) therefore modifies the insured driver's legal liability -in 
potentially enormous ways, given the catastrophic nature of the type of accidents that can 
result from a driver's sudden incapacity, and given how many drivers on Utah's roads 
carry only statutory minimum policy limits. So despite the superficial similarity in the 
results, the legal principles in operation arc quite different. 
The end result is that Lanccr~s attempt to limit the Injured Parties' recovery is an 
artificial attempt to impose a restriction on the Injured Parties' rights of recovery in a 
manner contrary to the plain language of the statute. The statute's plain language 
therefore caps the Injured Parties' recovery at the policy limits in effect at the time of the 
accident in question, and not the statutory minimum $25,000/$65,000. 
II 
20 /','·, ~ 
CONCLUSION 
Lancer's analysis does not address the dispositive statutory language. It instead 
relies on conclusory statements and case law that does not address the question before the 
court. Additionally, the statute contains additional plan language cues that support the 
Injured Parties' construction of the statute. The court should therefore answer Question 
;,i) #1 in the affirmative. 
With respect to Question #2, Lancer's position is not well-taken. It relies on case 
law that produces a facially similar result, but does so for significantly different legal 
reasons. Lancer overlooks the different legal reasons, resulting in an attempt to apply 
principles of contract law to a statute that modifies principles of tort law. Rather than 
~ entertain this construction, the court should follow the plain language of Subsection 
(1 )(b) and hold that the Injured Parties' maximum recovery is the policy limits in effect 
on the date of the accident. 
Finally, if the court is persuaded on Question #2 that statutory minimum 
requirements govern the Injured Parties' maximum recovery, it should apply the correct 
minimum insurance requirement, which happens to be the same as the actual policy limits 
in effect at the time of the accident underlying this case. 
Respectfully submitted on this, the 3 ~ay of August, 2016. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
rc.·:l\CI SOLORIO as pc~rsonal 
rez.--,:ces ntat ive of the estate 
of MIG EL ORNELAS SOLORIO; 
FILIBE TO JIMENEZ and ADELEDA 
ORELAS SOLORIO as heirs of 
decedent MIGUEL ORNELAS 
SOLORI1, 
I Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
•:~-! 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 2:0l-CV-0002SK 
Magistrate Judge Ronald N. Boyce 
Introduction 
Te defendant United States of America has moved this court 
for su mary judgment. It asserts that the plaintiffs have not 
establ · shed any negligence; that the undisputed facts show that its 
employ e was not negligent; and, that a private party would not be 
held n gligent under the same circumstances. It is mistaken. 
T [e plaintiffs have stated a clear prima facie negligence 
case. there is a classic factual dispute as to the 
defenda t's defense of sudden incapacitation. Finally, in Utah, 
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given he identical cir~~mstances, a private party would be liable 
to plaintiffs in this action. 1 Thus, there are no 
circum tances under which summary judgment is appropriate. 
gone 
Disputed and Undisputed Facts 
its statement of undisputed facts, the United States has 
r beyond a statement of facts. A significant portion of its 
nt is factual argument that goes completely to the weight of 
the te tirnony rather than being ~ . mdisputed fac't. Thus, rather than 
style, 
Undis 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
to separate factual arguments in a closing argument 
plaintiff disputes the defendant's statements 18-18. 
Facts 
April 16, 1999, a van owned by the Bureau of Land 
nagement, United States Department of Interior, was driven 
its employee Susan L. Michel in the course and scope of her 
(The defendant I s admitted answers, Answer to 
9 - 12 , Exh . 1) . 
ile driving north on State Street, Ms. Michel veered to the 
out of the travel lane, and into a sidewalk 
zone where she struck and killed Miguel Solorio. 
he defendant's admitted answers, Answer to Complaint~ 10-12 
• 1) . 
llowing the collision, Ms. Michel was found in her car 
n Utah, a driver is liable to an injured party even where 
that i jury is caused by some sudden incapacitating event such as 
a hear attack, seizure, etc. U.C.A. §31A-22-303(1) {a) (iv). 
-2-
Dis 
4. 
5. 
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h ving what appeared to be a ~~izure. (Deposition of Richard 
bert at pg 9-12). 
d Facts 
. Fumisuke Matsuo, a board-certified neurologist and expert 
w'tness for the defendant has opined that Ms. Michel had an 
seizure-like event while driving which caused the 
(Matsuo deposition at pg. 7, Exh. 2) . 
. Phillip Savia, a board-certified neurologist and expert 
w'tness for the plaintiff t~stified that he is 99.99% certain 
~,;-
at Ms. Michel did not have a seizure while driving. Rather, 
opines that the trauma from the collision caused her 
Deposition at pg. 25, Exh. 3). 
Argument 
POINT I 
he Plaintiff Has Established Prima Facie Negligence 
I9 its motion, the United States asserts that the plaintiff 
has not established each element of a prima facie negligence case. 
Its that a plaintiff must prove a negligent reason for 
a defe dant's negligent conduct. This mistaken assertion, if 
accept d, would add an additional element of negligence that does 
not 
neglig 
Braith 
1996} . 
the defendant pointed out, in Utah, the only elements of 
duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. 
West Vallev Cit 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 
-3-
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e defendant has admitted that it owed a duty of care to the 
The United States admits that the United States, the 
Bureau of Land Management, and Susan L. Michel owed 
Mr. Solorio a duty of care. . . (Defendant I s Answer to 
Complaint, Exh. 1). 
wever, in order to examine the defendant's conduct, it is 
ry to establish what duties were owed. 
by both statut;._e and the common-law. 
These duties are 
Statutes that are 
d to protect plaintiffs from a particular type of harm 
a duty of care. Day v. State Ex Rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 
980 P. d 1171 (Utah 1999). Additionally, the common law imposes a 
that 
duty of reasonable care on all people. Hadley v. Wood. 345 
7 (Utah 1959). 
re, there are numerous statutes and common-law doctrines 
specific duties of care. For example: 
e operator of a vehicle shall exercise ~are to avoid 
c lliding with any pedestrian. U.C.A. § 41-6-80. 
N person shall drive any vehicle on a sidewalk or 
s'dewalk area. U.C.A. § 41-6-106.1 
a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked 
nes for traffic ... (1) a vehicle shall be operated as 
arly as practical entirely within a single lane until 
e operator has determined that the movement can be made 
s fely. § 41-6-61. 
0 use reasonable care to keep [her] car under 
Wardel v. Jerman, 423 P.2d 485 (1976). 
-4-
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BREACH OF·DUTY 
Utah, a violation of the standards of safety set by statute 
or on-law is prima facie evidence of negligence. Klafta v. 
Smith, 404 P.2d 659, 661 (1965). This widely held principle has 
work 
en accepted by the Federal Court interpreting Utah law. 
United States, 288 F.Supp. 245 (D. Utah 1968). The 
Supreme Court eloquently described the principle at 
... No mat.ter how t.l-ie defendant founr" herself in the wrong 
1 ne, she was whe·ce she had no rigbt to be, and it was 
hr obligation to explain what she was doing there, and 
h w she got there ... When a motorist is on his right side 
o the highway, obeying all the rules of the highway, 
bing careful, cautious and considerate of the rights of 
hers, and suddenly he sees coming toward him like a 
rgantuan genie, a destroying force, it is not for him 
explain how and why the invader got into his way. 
rtainly a pedestrian on the sidewalk, when he is struck 
a car which skids from the highway onto the sidewalk, 
i juring him, is not required by t.he law to employ 
m chanics to inspect the invading vehicle, surveyors to 
m~asure the distances, and to look for witnesses to 
t~stify to the undue speed, mechanical difficulties or 
odher causes for the intruder's violent trespassing. 
Cm bell v. Fiorot 191 A.2d 657, 659 (Pa 1963) (emphasis 
a ded) . 
H prima facie breach of duty is clear. In its answer 
to the plaintiff's complaint, the United States admitted to the 
conduct which breached the duties. In addition, it also cited that 
conduc in its memorandum in support of it motion: 
T. e United States admits that Susan L. Michel was an 
e loyee of the Bureau of Land Management and was driving 
a an owned by the United States government and that the 
v veered to the ri ht into the construction zone 
strikin the decedent. (Defendant's Answer 1 10, Exh. 
1) . (Emphasis added). 
-5-
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* * * 
e United States admits that the van continued through 
e construction cite and dragged Mr. Solorio after 
tting him. (Defendant's Answer 111, Exh. 1). 
* * * 
cording to Ms. Warnick, the van 'looked like [it] was 
ing to make a sudden turn' to the right, and ended up 
tting a dirt pile, a cement barrier, and Mr. Solorio. 
efendant's Memorandum Pg. 3, 1 5). 
is conduct clearly breached the statutory and common-law 
standa ds of care cited above. Ms. Michel lost control of the van. 
She al owed it to l~ave the marked lane and drive into the sidewalk 
constr ction area. There she hit and killed a Miguel Solorio. 
Based n the applicable duties and the admitted evidence, the 
plaint ffs have established a prima facie case of negligence. 
case, 
or 
or 
Lei 
POINT II 
The Defendant Has the Burden to 
Prove Its Affirmative Defense 
though the plaintiff has stated a prima facie negligence 
defendant's negligent conduct may be subject to an excuse 
ification. Platis at 262, quoting Klafta at 661. Excuse 
ification for a negligent act is an affirmative defense. 
urniture and Ca et v. Isom 657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah 1982). 
alleging that Ms. Michel had a seizure that caused an 
t, the United States has raised an affirmative defense which 
that her negligent acts should be excused. This is an 
nt sequence because the United States bears the burden of 
-6-
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both p eading and proving its affirmative defense. Sea},, v. Gowan, 
923 P. d 1361,1363 {Utah 1996). Moreover, it has the burden of 
each element of its defense. Id. 
e United States has claimed that Ms. Michel had a seizure 
that c used the accident. This is a well known, common-law 
tive defense to negligence. Throughout the United States, 
it is known by a variety of names: the loss of consciousness 
de fens , Malcolm v. Pa tick 14 7 So2d 188 (Fla. App. 1962) ; the 
sudden incapacity defense, Smi..t.h_Y. Garrett, 230 SE2d 775 {NC 
.., 
1977); the act of god defense, Christensen V. Gammons, 197 A2d •·150 
(DC 19 4); and also, the unavoidable accident defense, Porter v. 
Price, 355 P.2d 66 (Utah 1960). 
I order to establish the defense the United States must prove 
that: !1) Ms. Michel suffered a loss of consciousness or medical 
condit~on that prevented her from controlling the van. Goodrich v. 
Blair, 1646 P.2d 890 {Ariz. App. 1982), VanderHout v. Johnson, 446 
(Oregon 1968) . Id. at Malcom. (2) That the loss of 
consci usness occurred before the alleged negligent act. Arthur v. 
Royse, 574 SW2d 22 (Mo App 1978), Kohler v. Sheffert, 96 NW2d 911 
(Iowa 1959). (3) That the unconsciousness was unforeseeable. Walker 
v. Cardwell, 348 So2d 1049 (Ala. 1977). 
T s, by introducing deposition testimony of Dr. Matsuo, the 
United 
defens 
has offered evidence in support of its affirmative 
Based on its analysis of the case law, it concludes that 
idence satisfies its burden and that it is entitled to 
summar judgment. However, it's analysis and conclusions are in 
-7-
1 
! 
i 
~ 
I 
66 
This 
ase 2:01-cv-00025-DAK Document 36 Filed 08/28/02 Page 8 of 15 
ecause it has misread both the context of the cases and the 
d burdens of proof. 
States relies heavily on Porter v. Price, 355 P.2d 
In alluding to Porter, the United States makes an 
rted and errant statement of Utah law. It asserts that: 
der Utah law, a sudden and unforeseeable loss of 
c nsciousness rendering a driver unable to control a 
tor vehicle does not constitute negligence, because it 
i volves circumstances beyond the control of the 
r asonable person. Defendant Memorandum at pg.9. 
not the law in Utah. Porter actually stands for the 
sudden unconsciousness may relieve a tortfeasor 
ponsibility for his negligent actions. In Porter, the Utah 
Court upheld a jury verdict. In response to a prima facie 
nee case, the defendant raised the affirmative defense of a 
diabetic seizure and the case was submitted to a jury. The jury 
found t ere was no negligence and the case was appealed because of 
in 
instruction. 
judgment. 
In Utah this case could not be settled on 
Porter was the first in long line of Utah cases 
with unavoidable accidents and jury instruction. 2 However, 
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232, 
1237 ( tah 1984); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 
1983}; nderton v. Mont ome , 607 P.2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980); 
Strin am v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425 (Utah 1974); Ellis v. 
Hathaw , 493 P.2d 985, 986 (1972); Wagner v. Olsen 482 P.2d 702, 
705 (1971); Calahan v. Wood, 465 P.2d 169 (1970); Woodhouse v. 
Johnso, 436 P.2d 442, 444-45 (1968); Wellman v. Noble, 366 P.2d 
701, 70 (1961); Porter v. Price, 355 P.2d 66, 67-68 (1960}; 
Steele . Wilkinson, 349 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1960); Alvarez v. 
Paulus, 333 P.2d 633, 635 (1959); Best v. Huber, 281 P.2d 208, 
209 (19 5) . 
-8-
ase 2:0l-cv-00025-DAK Document 36 Filed 08/28/02 Page 9 of 15 
Court verruled all these previous cases, and stated that the i.YJ::y 
must 
over 
that 
court' 
operly apply the elements of negligence. Id. at 1335 36. 
United States also relies on Cruz v. United States of 
987 F.Supp. 1299 (D. Haw. 1997). There, a postal worker 
a pedestrian when he lost control of his truck because of 
Yet there, the plaintiff did not allege negligent 
of the car. Rather, he alleged that the defendant was 
in not seeing a doctor and that he should have pulled 
fore his heart attack. 
reover, like Porter, the critica.i. distinction in Cruz is 
was not a summary judgment. The Cruz decision was the 
trial decision as the fact finder based on completely 
differ nt allegations of negligence. 
the United States cited and attached Langland v. 
United , States of America, 2 002 WL 22 5 93 7 (D. Mass. 2 002) . In 
Langladd, the undisputed facts established that the defendant had 
a brai~ tumor and that the tumor caused his symptoms and the 
I 
accide1~· The only thing at issue was the third element of the 
uncons,1ousness defense: was the undisputed unconsciousness 
forese,able? 
Foreseeability is an element of duty and/or proximate 
causation. Unforeseeable Conseguences, pg. 280, Prosser and 
Keeton n Torts 5 th Edition (1988). Viewed as an element of duty, 
it is sually examined by a court as a matter of law. Id. In 
~' the court examined the 
foreseebbil i ty and the undisputed 
I 
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judgment. 
re, in contrast, the unconsciousness is disputed. Moreover, 
the pl inti ff established a prima facie negligence case. In 
is 
e, the defendant offered some evidence on its affirmative 
of sudden incapacitation. Yet, that speculative offering 
contradicted by the plaintiffs evidence. The 
nt' s offering is not enough to warrant summary judgment. It 
is mer ly a factual argument to be submitted to the fact finder at 
trial s happened in ?orter and~-
POINT III 
There s a Question of Fact As to When Susan Michel Had a Seizure 
summary judgment, a court must view all the facts and 
justif'able inferences from those facts in a light most favorable 
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 
its motion, the defendant offered the deposition testimony 
of Dr. atsuo to support its contention that Ms. Michel suffered a 
prior to the accident. Unfortunately, the defendant 
ed to inform the court of the opposing evidence offered by 
intiff 1 s expert neurologist: 
. Swent: 
Savia: 
How certain are you that Susan Michel did 
not have a seizure before the accident? 
I'm fairly certain that she did not have 
a seizure prior to the accident. 
I'm going to ask you to put a number on 
it. 
Over 50 percent. 
-10-
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Swent: Do you have a precise number? 
Savia: I would probably say 99.99 percent. 
Swent: You're pretty certain? 
Savia: Yes. 
of Dr. Philip S. Savia M.D. Pg. 25, Exh. 3) 
e defendant's neurologist says that Ms. Michel had a seizure 
before the accident and that the seizure caused the accident. 
O the other hand, the plaintiff's neurologist says that she 
had a eizure because of the trauma in the accident and that the 
~ccide t caused the seizure. 
T is a classic question of fact on the defendant's 
affirm tive defense. Summary judgment must be denied. 
POINT IV 
Dr. ilip Savia Is Qualified to Testify As an Expert Witness 
T~l United States 
qualif ed to testify as 
errone us. 
has suggested that 
an expert witness. 
Dr. 
This 
Savia is not 
suggestion is 
T States asserts that Dr. Savia is not qualified to 
~estif because he stated in his deposition that he was not an 
expert n epilepsy. This argument is misplaced for many reasons. 
First, he fact that an expert witness indicates that he is not an 
expert tn a topic, or that another person is more of an expert on 
the toJic, has no bearing on the admissibility of the testimony. 
The medical definition of the word expert, and the legal definition 
of the ord expert, are significantly different. 
-11-
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a court ca~inot delegate to an expert its duty to 
the law. Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 
919 (CA6 1991). Thus, the court, not Dr. Savia or Dr. 
must decide whether Dr. Savia is a qualified expert 
there is no evidence in this case that Ms. Michel has 
y or a seizure disorder. Even the defendant's expert refers 
lleged seizure as a seizure-like event. The issue is one 
tential seizure. The logical medical specialty to consult 
neurology. Thus, any board-certified neurologist 
posses es the knowledge, skill, training, experience, and education 
B 
neurol 
seizur 
Federal Rules to render an opinion about seizures. 
Dr. Savi a and Dr. Matsuo are board certified 
Both are qualified to treat patients that have 
seizure disorders. Both do in fact treat seizure 
The fact that they have chosen different sub-specialties 
within eurology is irrelevant to admissibility. Payton v. Abbott 
Labs , 7 8 0 F . 2 d . 14 7 , 15 5 ( 1st Cir . 19 8 5) . Specialization goes to 
the we'ght of the testimony, not admissibility. Id. Thus, Dr. 
Savia is qualified to render his opinion on the alleged seizure. 
POINT IV 
If Dr. Savia'e Testimony Is Speculative, So Too Is Dr. Matsuo's 
and Dr. Caravati's. 
T defendant asserts that the Dr. Savia is speculating when 
he opi es that the seizure was caused by impact trauma. However, 
-12-
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is unsupported. The defendant offers z:.) evidence, 
discus or analysis for its claim. Thus, the court should 
ignore the defendant's claim entirely. 
H wever, if the court considers the argument, it should also 
view Matsuo and Dr. Caravati's opinions using the same 
standa If Dr. Savia's testimony is speculative, then both of 
the de expert opinions are also clearly speculative, and 
Conclusion 
Tjis is a case where the plainti=f has established a prima 
facie case of negligence. In response, the defendant has raised 
an affirmative defense of sudden incapacitation. It has now 
asked this court to enter a summary judgment on that defense. 
Howeve, summary judgment cannot be entered because there is a 
classic factual dispute as to that affirmative defense. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August 2002, 
11scr'1wps10.-c/b1 adis l111io/pluppu,c.brf wpd 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOC. 
arren W. Driggs 
J. Bradford DeBry 
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